In this paper, we focus our attention on the problem of automating the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance where fault-tolerance is added to an existing (fault-intolerant) 
Introduction
We focus on the automation of failsafe fault-tolerant programs, i.e., programs that satisfy their safety specification if faults occur. We begin with a fault-intolerant program and systematically add fault-tolerance to it. The resulting program, thus, guarantees that if no faults occur then the specification is satisfied. However, if faults do occur then at least the safety specification is satisfied. There are several advantages of such automation. For one, the synthesized program is correct by construction and there is no need for its correctness proof. Second, since we begin with an existing fault-intolerant program, the derived faulttolerant program reuses it. Therefore, it would be possible to add fault-tolerance even to programs for which the entire specification is not available or where the existing program is the de-facto specification. Third, in this approach, the concerns of the functionality of a program and its faulttolerance are separated. This separation is known to help [1] in simplifying the reuse of the techniques used in manually adding fault-tolerance. We expect that the same advantage will apply in the automated addition of fault-tolerance. The main difficulty in automating the addition of faulttolerance, however, is the complexity involved in this process. In [2] , Kulkarni and Arora showed that the problem of adding masking fault-tolerance -where both safety and liveness are satisfied in the presence of faults-is NP-hard. We find that there are three possible options to deal with this complexity: (1) develop heuristics under which the synthesis algorithm takes polynomial time, (2) consider a weaker form of fault-tolerance such as failsafe -where only safety is satisfied in the presence of faults, or nonmasking -where safety may be violated temporarily if faults occur, or (3) identify a class of specifications and programs for which the addition of fault-tolerance can be performed in polynomial time.
The first approach was used in [3] , where Kulkarni, Arora and Chippada presented heuristics that are applicable to several problems including byzantine agreement. In polynomial time, their algorithm finds a fault-tolerant program or it declares that a fault-tolerant program cannot be synthesized. In this paper, we focus on the other two approaches. Regarding the second approach, we focus our attention on the design of failsafe fault-tolerance. By adding failsafe fault-tolerance in an automated fashion, we can simplifyand partly automate-the design of masking fault-tolerant programs. More specifically, the algorithm that automates the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance and the stepwise method for designing masking fault-tolerance [1] can be combined to partially automate the design of masking fault-tolerant programs. The algorithm in [1] shows how a masking faulttolerant program can be designed by first designing a failsafe (respectively, nonmasking) fault-tolerant program and then adding nonmasking (respectively, failsafe) fault-tolerance to it. Thus, given an algorithm that automates the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance, we can automate one step of designing masking fault-tolerance. In our investigation, we find that the design of distributed failsafe fault-tolerant programs is also NP-hard. To show this, we provide a reduction from 3-SAT to the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance. To deal with the complexity involved in automating the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance, we follow the third approach considered above. Specifically, we identify the restrictions that can be imposed on specifications and faultintolerant programs in order to ensure that failsafe fault-tolerance can be added in polynomial time. Towards this end, we identify a class of specifications, namely monotonic specifications, and a class of programs, namely monotonic programs. Given a (positive) monotonic specification and a (negative) monotonic program, we show that failsafe faulttolerance can be added in polynomial time. Finally, we note that the class of monotonic specifications contains wellrecognized [4] [5] [6] problems of distributed consensus, atomic commitment, and byzantine agreement. We also argue that the restrictions imposed on the specification and the fault-intolerant program are necessary. More specifically, we show that if restrictions are imposed only on the specification (respectively, the fault-intolerant program) then the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance is still NP-hard.
Organization of the paper.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a few basic concepts such as programs, computations, specifications, faults and fault-tolerance. In Section 3, we state the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance. In Section 4, we prove the NP-completeness of the problem of adding failsafe faulttolerance. In Section 5, we precisely define the notion of monotonic specifications and monotonic programs, and show their necessity and sufficiency for adding failsafe faulttolerance in polynomial time. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give formal definitions of programs, problem specifications, faults, and fault-tolerance. The programs are specified in terms of their state space and their transitions. The definition of specifications is adapted from Alpern and Schneider [7] . The definition of faults and faulttolerance is adapted from Arora and Gouda [8] and Kulkarni [1] . The issues of modeling distributed programs is adapted from [2] . A similar modeling of distributed programs in read/write atomicity was independently identified by Attie and Emerson [9] . Most definitions in this section are straightforward, and are included to make the paper self-contained. A reader who is familiar with this area can skip this section if necessary. We ask the reader to carefully look how distribution is modeled (cf. Section 2.2), how safety specification is specified (cf. second paragraph in Section 2.3) and the definition of failsafe fault-tolerance (cf. fourth paragraph in Section 2.4). 
Program

Issues of Distribution
Now, we present the issues that distribution introduces during the addition of fault-tolerance. More specifically, we identify how read/write restrictions on a process affect its transitions.
Write restrictions.
Given a transition´× ¼ × ½ µ, it is straightforward to determine the variables that need to be changed in order to modify the state from × ¼ to × ½ . Thus, the write restrictions amount to ensuring that the transitions of a process only modify those variables that it can write. More specifically, if process can only write the variables in Û and the value of a variable other than that in Û is changed in the transition´× ¼ × ½ µ then that transition cannot be used in obtaining the transitions of . In other words, if can only write variables in Û then cannot use the transitions in ÒÛ´ Û µ, where
Read restrictions.
Given a single transition´× ¼ × ½ µ, it appears that all the variables must be read in order for that transition to be executed. For this reason, read restrictions require us to group transitions and ensure that the entire group is included or the entire group is excluded. As an example, consider a program consisting of two variables and , and let their domain be ¼ ½ . Suppose that we have a process that cannot read . Now, observe that the transition from the state 
The grouping of transitions caused by the inability to read is used in Section 4 to show that the problem of adding faulttolerance is NP-hard.
Specification
A specification is a set of infinite sequences of states that is suffix closed and fusion closed. Suffix closure of the set means that if a state sequence is in that set then so are all the suffixes of . Following Alpern and Schneider [7] , we let the specification consist of a safety specification and a liveness specification. For the problem of adding failsafe faulttolerance, the safety specification is specified in terms of a set of bad transitions that should not occur in any program computation. I.e., for program Ô, its safety specification is a
is not specified in our algorithm; we show that the faulttolerant program satisfies the liveness specification (in the absence of faults) iff the fault-intolerant program satisfies the liveness specification. Moreover, in the problem of adding fault-tolerance, the initial fault-intolerant program satisfies its specification (including the liveness specification). Thus, the liveness specification need not be specified explicitly. Since the specification is suffix closed, it is always possible to specify the safety specification as a set of bad transitions.
For reasons of space, we refer the reader to [1] for the proof of this claim. We also refer the reader to [1] where we show that it is possible to convert a set of state sequences that is not suffix closed and/or fusion closed into an equivalent set that is suffix closed and fusion closed. 
Notation.
Let ×Ô be a specification. We use the term safety of ×Ô to mean the smallest safety specification that includes ×Ô . Also, whenever the specification is clear from the context, we will omit it; thus, Ë is an invariant of Ô abbreviates Ë is an invariant of Ô for spec.
Faults
The faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by transitions. A fault from the context, we will omit it; thus, "Ë is an invariant"
abbreviates "Ë is an invariant of Ô" and " is a fault" abbreviates " is a fault for Ô". Also, whenever the specification ×Ô and the invariant Ë are clear from the context, we omit them; thus, " -tolerant" abbreviates " -tolerant for ×Ô from Ë", and so on.
Problem Statement
In this section, we formally state the problem of adding faulttolerance. During automated addition of fault-tolerance, we begin with the fault-intolerant program, its invariant, faults and the safety specification that needs to be satisfied in the presence of faults. The goal is to only add failsafe faulttolerance to develop a program that reuses the given faultintolerant program. In other words, we require that any new computations that are added in the fault-tolerant program are solely for the purpose of dealing with faults; no new computations are introduced when faults do not occur. 
NP-Completeness proof
In this section, we prove that the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance is NP-hard. Towards this end, we reduce 3-SAT to the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance. First, we present 3-SAT problem and then we identify the mapping between 3-SAT and the addition problem in Section 3.
3-SAT problem.
Given is a set of literals, Ü ½ Ü ¾ Ü Ò and Ü ¼ Mapping 3-SAT to the problem of adding failsafe faulttolerance. To map the given 3-SAT formula into an instance of the addition problem, we identify states and transitions corresponding to each literal and disjunction. Then, we identify the invariant of the fault-intolerant program, the safety specification, and the value assignment to variables. Finally, we show that the 3-SAT formula is satisfiable iff failsafe fault-tolerance can be added to this instance of the addition problem. The states of the fault-intolerant program. Corresponding to each literal Ü and its complement we introduce the following states (see Figure 2) : 
The transitions of the fault-intolerant program.
Corresponding to each literal Ü and its complement Ü ¼ , we introduce the following transitions (cf. Figure 2 ):
Corresponding to each 
In the reduction from the 3-SAT problem, the transitioń ¼ Ñ ¼ Ñ µ is included iff Ü Ñ is false, and the transitioń µ is included iff Ü is true. Thus, if evaluates to true then at least one of the transitions introduced for is not included. We choose the safety specification in such a way that it is violated iff all three transitions that correspond to any disjunction are included. Correspondingly, the truth value of Ü will be decided based upon whether the transition´ ½ Ü µ is included or whether transitioń ½ Ü ¼ µ is included. We choose the safety specification in such a way that both these transitions are not included. Figure 3 ). As an illustration, we have shown the partial mapping when Ü ½ ØÖÙ , Ü ¾ Ð × , and Ü ¿ ØÖÙ in Figure   4 . Based on the grouping discussed earlier, the transitionś Since this is a contradiction, it follows that each disjunct in the 3-SAT formula is true.
Monotonic Specifications and Programs: Necessity and Sufficiency
Since the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance is NP-hard, as discussed in the Introduction, we focus on this question:
What restrictions can be imposed on the specifications, programs and faults in order to guarantee that the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance can be done in polynomial time?
As seen in Section 4, a group of transitions may include a transition within the invariant of the fault-intolerant program and a transition that violates safety, together. To add failsafe fault-tolerance we have to determine whether should be included. This issue is one of the reasons behind the complexity of adding safety. To identify the restrictions that need to be imposed on the specification, the fault-intolerant program and the faults, we begin with the following question: If all transitions in Ô Ë are included then it follows that Ô ¼ will not deadlock in any state in Ë, and hence, Ô ¼ will satisfy its specification from Ë. Now, we need to ensure that safety will not be violated due to fault transitions and the transitions that are grouped with those in Ô Ë.
In this section, we first define a class of specifications, monotonic specifications, and a class of programs, monotonic programs. The intent of these definitions is to identify conditions under which a process can make safe estimates of variables that it cannot read. Then, we introduce the concept of fault-safe specifications. Subsequently, we argue that the monotonicity restrictions imposed on specifications and programs are sufficient and necessary for adding failsafe fault-tolerance in polynomial time.
Consider the case where process cannot read the value of a boolean variable Ü. 
Negative monotonicity and monotonicity with respect to non-boolean variables.
By swapping the word Ð × and ØÖÙ in the above definition, we can define negative monotonicity. Also, although we defined monotonicity with respect to boolean variables, it can be extended to deal with non-boolean variables. One approach is to partition the domain of the non-boolean variable Ü into two parts, and define Ü ØÖÙ if the value of Ü lies in the first part and false otherwise. We use this definition later in this section while discussing the necessity of the monotonic programs and specifications.
Fault-safe specifications. In a fault-safe specification ×Ô , if a fault transition´× ¼ × ½ µ violates ×Ô then all transitions that reach state × ¼ violate ×Ô . One interpretation of this definition is that the first transition that causes safety to be violated is a program transition.
Definition. Given a specification ×Ô and faults , we say that ×Ô is -safe iff the following condition is satisfied.
For most problems, the specifications being considered are fault-safe. To understand this, consider the problem of mutual exclusion where a fault may cause a process to fail. In this problem, failure of a process does not violate the safety; safety is violated if some process subsequently accesses its critical section even though some other process is already in the critical section. Thus, the first transition that causes safety to be violated is a program transition. We also note that the specifications for byzantine agreement, consensus and commit are -safe for the corresponding faults. In fact, given a specification ×Ô and a fault , we can obtain an equivalent specification ×Ô that prohibits the execution of the following transitions. 
Necessity of Monotonicity.
We consider the following question:
Is monotonicity of specifications/programs necessary to obtain polynomial time synthesis of failsafe fault-tolerance? We argue that the answer to this question is affirmative. More specifically, we observe that if only monotonicity of the fault-intolerant program (respectively, specification) were available, the addition of failsafe fault-tolerance would be NP-hard. To see this, we recall the reduction of 3-SAT to the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance. In that proof, we mapped the 3-SAT problem to a fault-intolerant program Ô, its invariant Ë, faults and specification ×Ô . We make the following observations about them: i) ×Ô is -safe as no fault transition violates ×Ô (×Ô is violated if some program action is executed after the fault action ), ii) letting
×Ô is negative monotonic with respect to , iii) Ô is negative monotonic with respect to . Thus, if the faultintolerant program is negative monotonic (with respect to the appropriate variables) and no condition is imposed on the specification, the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance is NP-hard. By symmetry, if the specification is positive monotonic (with respect to the appropriate variables) and no condition is imposed on the fault-intolerant program, the problem still remains NP-hard.
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
In this paper, we focused on the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance to an existing fault-intolerant program. A failsafe fault-tolerant program satisfies its specification (including safety and liveness) when no faults occur. However, if faults occur, it satisfies at least the safety specification. We showed, in Section 4, that the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance is NP-hard. Towards this end, we reduced the 3-SAT problem to the problem of adding failsafe fault-tolerance. In broader perspective, we are interested in identifying the problems for which the synthesis of fault-tolerant programs can be designed efficiently (in polynomial time) and the problems for which exponential complexity is inevitable (unless È AE È ). By identifying such a boundary, we
can determine the problems that can easily reap the benefits of automation and the problems for which heuristics need to be developed in order to benefit from automation. This paper helps to make this boundary more precise than [2] in three ways. For one, the proof in [2] is for masking faulttolerance where both safety and liveness need to be satisfied. By contrast, the NP-completeness in this paper applies to the class where only safety is satisfied. Second, the proof in [2] relies on the ability of a process to blindly write some variables. By contrast, the proof in this paper does not rely on such an assumption. The third -and the most important-step in identifying the boundary is addressed in Section 5 where we identified a class of specifications and a class of programs for which failsafe fault-tolerance can be added in polynomial time. Towards this end, we imposed two restrictions: positive monotonicity of the specification and negative monotonicity of the fault-intolerant program. We showed that these restrictions are both necessary and sufficient. For sufficiency, in Section 5, we showed that given a positive monotonic specification and a negative monotonic program, it is possible to add failsafe fault-tolerance in polynomial time. For necessity, we showed that negative monotonicity was satisfied in the instance of the addition problem generated in Section 4. However, in that instance, positive monotonicity of the specification was not satisfied. It follows that the problem of adding fault-tolerance remains NP-hard if one begins with a negative monotonic program and an arbitrary specification. Likewise, by symmetry, polynomial time algorithm cannot be synthesized (unless È AE È ) if the specification is positive monotonic but the fault-intolerant program is not negative monotonic. The synthesis approach in this paper differs from that in [9, [11] [12] [13] [14] where one begins with a specification and obtains a fault-tolerant program. When a fault-tolerant program can be designed in an automated fashion, we expect that it will be easier to add fault-tolerance if we begin with a fault-intolerant program than if we begin with just the specification. Also, our approach allows one to reuse a given fault-intolerant program and, hence, it provides the potential that it can preserve properties such as efficiency that are difficult to model in an automated synthesis procedure. Our work suggests several future directions. For one, given a fault-intolerant program and its invariant that do not satisfy monotonicity requirements, how can we modify the invariant such that monotonicity requirements are met while ensuring that the program satisfies the specification from the new invariant. Thus, a heuristic based on the principle of modifying the given invariant may be used to add failsafe fault-tolerance in polynomial time. We are investigating the conditions under which this heuristic will be applicable. We are also developing heuristics to deal with the case where the given specification does not satisfy the monotonicity requirements.
